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Abstract
This paper examines the interaction between a growth-oriented ter-
rorist organization and an uninformed government based on a two-period
signaling game. The terrorists, taking into account the government's
counter-terrorism response to first period attacks, gain additional man-
power from successful attacks and choose their strategy to maximize the
available manpower at the end of period 2. The government tries to
infer the terrorist organization's size from the terrorists' attack choice
it observes in period 1 and adjusts its second period counter-terrorism
spending according to the perceived threat of terrorism. Combining the
signaling game and organizational growth approaches of previous con-
tributions, this paper shows that, if a terrorist group follows a growth
strategy, it has an incentive to appear weaker than it is by mimicking
the behaviour of a smaller organization. Furthermore, depending on its
beliefs about the extent of the terrorist threat it can be optimal for a gov-
ernment to spend more on second period counter-terrorism measures if it
is not attacked than if it were attacked. The behaviour of contemporary
terrorist groups suggests that the assumptions of a growth strategy and
mimicking behaviour are justified.
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1 Introduction
Terrorism is one of the big challenges of the 21st century to be overcome by de-
veloped Western democracies, emerging nations and developing countries alike.1
In 2009, about 11.000 terror attacks took place worldwide, resulting in the death
or injury of almost 58.000 people (US Department of State, 2010). In the same
year, Europe alone was hit by about 300 terror attacks (Europol, 2010). Apart
from very salient attacks in large and developed countries such as 9/11, the
bombings in the public transport systems of Madrid and London in 2004 and
2005 and the 2011 attack on the Domodedowo airport in Moscow, most acts
of terrorism are perpetrated in developing regions and go largely unreported in
Western media. Their direct and indirect effects on the lives and happiness of
affected people and on political and economic outcomes are immense, neverthe-
less.2 Terrorism in countries as diverse as Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan and
Iraq proves to be a severe danger to the stability of the political system and
seriously hampers economic growth.3 Terrorism also harms individual firms,
distorts trade and forces governments to divert public spending to prevent acts
of terror.4
Starting with the Al-Qaeda attacks against the USA in 2001, economic re-
search into the economic causes and consequences of terrorism has intensified.
1As Frey and Luechinger (2003) point out, there is no universally accepted definition of
terrorism. In this paper terrorism is thus considered to be any obviously illegal action taken
by an organization classified as terrorist such as kidnappings, bank robberies and hijackings.
2For an extensive overview over terrorism-related economic research, see Schneider et al.
(2010). The impact of terrorism on individual happiness has been the subject of research by
Frey et al. (2007). Terrorism-induced fear is the topic of recent work by Becker and Rubinstein
(2011), while the socioeconomic determinants of this fear have been examined by Brück and
Müller (2009).
Terrorism in Israel has led to a significant shift of parties' political stances towards accom-
modation of Palestinian interests and left policies (Gould and Klor, 2010).
The immediate and short-run impact of terrorism, i.e. the destruction of physical and
human capital, may be minor in comparison to long-run effects like additional transactions
costs and changes in behaviour and factor prices. See, for instance, Krugman (2004) and cost
calculations of the 9/11 aftermath by Penm et al. (2004).
3Macroeconomic consequences of terrorism have been examined by, for instance, Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2008), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Enders et al. (2006), Blomberg and
Mody (2005), Gupta et al. (2004) and Blomberg et al. (2004), with the general result that
terrorism hampers growth, deters investment and has the worst effects in developing countries.
4In a trade context, terrorism has been modelled as a strategic game played between ra-
tional and utility-maximizing governments and terrorist organizations, in which governments
decide on border controls and counter-terrorism measures while terror organizations accord-
ingly choose what and how to attack (Mirza and Verdier, 2008).
As measured by market capitalization, Royal Dutch Shell, BP and Coca Cola alone have
lost over $US 20 billion by terror attacks between 1995 and 2002 (Karolyi and Martell, 2006).
And between 2001 and 2011, the USA has spent $US 1.3 trillion on its self-proclaimed War
on Terror (Belasco, 2009).
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It is obvious that in order to develop optimal responses to terrorism, one has to
understand the structure of terrorist organization and the nature of the decisions
they make. For this purpose game theory is particularly suited.5
The aim of this paper is to characterize the interaction between a growth-
oriented terrorist organization and a government that tries to protect itself from
terrorism. To this end the two period signaling game approaches as in Lapan
and Sandler (1993), Overgaard (1994) and Arce and Sandler (2007) are com-
bined with an organizational growth framework as in Feinstein and Kaplan
(2010).6 Terrorists choose their attack strategies according to their initial man-
power and expected government counter-terrorism response in order to maxi-
mize their manpower at the end of period 2, while governments attempt to infer
the size of the terrorist group by its first period actions and adjust their counter-
terrorism spending accordingly. The governments' counter-terrorism efforts also
depend on their ex-ante beliefs about the terrorist group size and the damage
governments suffer from attacks.
It turns out that in contrast to the common assumption that (bigger) ter-
rorist attacks increase counter-terrorism efforts, the government response to an
attack in the first period is not necessarily higher than if no attack occurs. This
is because a government might take a small first period attack as a sign that
the resources of the terrorists are not sufficient for a big second period attack.
Also, while Lapan and Sandler (1993) and Overgaard (1994) claim that terror-
ists want to appear as strong as possible, this paper finds that, given that they
pursue a growth strategy or derive utility from other sources than government
concessions, terrorists may want to appear weaker than they are. This is due to
the terrorists' strategic interest to provoke as little counter-terrorism effort as
possible so as not to endanger their operations in period 2. This idea is also put
forward by Arce and Sandler (2007), but the belief set and response strength of
the government are exogenously given. The behaviour of contemporary terror-
ist groups and counter-terrorism spending trends suggest that the theoretical
findings of this paper may be at work in the real world. For instance, Ger-
man right-wing terrorists did not publicly claim responsibility for assassinations
of foreign shop owners in the past decade, and there is no obvious connection
5For instance, Sandler and Arce (2003) present a variety of game theoretic applications to
the issue of terrorism, including choice of targets, deterrence vs. pre-emption and others. A
different game theoretic approach has been taken by Konrad (2004) to determine the invest-
ment decisions of terrorist organizations and subsequent conflict outcomes. For an overview
over game theoretic developments in terrorism research, see Sandler and Siqueira (2009).
6The signaling games usually contain a third period in which actions are already determined
by the two previous periods. I will thus refer to these games as consisting of two periods.
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between terror attacks and the budgets of the main German counter-terrorism
agencies. Attacks like the Al-Qaeda parcel bombs originating in Yemen in 2010
are exploited particularly for their propaganda value, and it is not clear whether
these relatively small attacks should be regarded as a sign of strength and an
altered strategy as Al-Qaeda claims, or of a lack of resources and weakness (Die
Zeit, 2010, November 2).
As indicated, the contributions by Lapan and Sandler (1993), Overgaard
(1994) and Arce and Sandler (2007) which focus on military and political
terrorists (these terms are discussed in section 2) in two period signaling games
with asymmetric information are directly related to this paper. Lapan and
Sandler (1993) develop a model of military terrorism in which terrorists try to
appear as strong as possible to force concessions from a government. Terrorists
do this by signaling their strength with an attack in the first period which
is used by the government as an indicator whether standing firm and suffering
further attacks or giving in and suffering from concessions is the better strategy.
Overgaard (1994) models a similar game with political terrorists. Arce and
Sandler (2007) present a model in which terrorists differ by type (military or
political), and in which the government attempts to distinguish between terrorist
types by the size of a first period attack. The authors mention the possibility
that military terrorists hold back in period 1 so government retaliation to their
second period attack will be lower, but do not endogenously determine the extent
of the government response. Furthermore, they assume that the government
response will always be stronger if a spectacular attack took place in the first
period than if only a small attack was perpetrated. In contrast, this paper
allows for an endogenous government response that can be less severe even if an
attack is observed in the first period. The terrorists' attack decision in the first
period is explictly derived as a function of the endogenous government response.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the different
strategies a terrorist organization may choose and gives examples of particular
terrorist groups pursuing these strategies. Sections 3 and 4 develop a model
of terrorist-government interaction, while section 5 discusses the results and
section 6 concludes.
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2 Terrorist strategies
One can distinguish between three different general strategies of terrorist orga-
nizations: Influence through violence with violence as an end in itself (military
strategy), influence through violence with violence as a mean (political strategy),
and growth through violence with violence as a propaganda and advertising tool
(growth strategy).7
In the case of military terrorists, terrorists act nihilistic or vengeful in the
sense that attacks are still perpetrated even if there is no chance that the tar-
geted entity will agree to the terrorists' demands. Examples for this strategy are
terrorist organizations without affiliated political parties, e.g. the RAF (Rote
Armee Fraktion) in Germany. The RAF carried out attacks even though it was
clear that the German government would not concede to their demands.8 Bern-
holz (2004) argues that the military type of terrorism is inspired by supreme
values which are non-negotiable fundamental beliefs. Terrorism is used as a
means to violently propagate demands a government would or could never agree
to, such as the expulsion of all Jews from the Near East.
In the political case, violence will only be used as long as it has a chance
of influencing decisions. If violence has no effect, funds are used for political
activities. Terrorists pursuing a political strategy are usually connected with
political parties, such as the IRA (Irish Republican Army) with its links to Sinn
Fein and the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) with its ties to Herri Batasuna.9
Organizations engaging in political terrorism usually have limited and negotiable
demands such as partial independence or stronger minority rights.
Finally, growth strategies are utilized when a terrorist organization is just
starting out, stands in competition with other similar organizations or tries
to acquire a certain manpower and fund level to enable a particular operation.
Epstein and Gang (2007) argue that terrorist groups benefit from being larger in
a rent-seeking contest between terrorist groups where benefits are not related to
government concessions. Pursuing a growth strategy which is aimed at becoming
the largest terrorist group would also be sensible in this context.
For an exogenous government response, terrorist organizations acting accord-
ing to a growth strategy have been examined by Feinstein and Kaplan (2010)
7A further differentiation of these strategies and examples can be found in Kydd and Walter
(2006).
8Amongst these demands were the abolition of capitalism and of the liberal democratic
system.
9Herri Batasuna was banned by Spain in 2003 due to its terrorist affiliations.
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who find that the scale and type of attacks are determined by the initial size
of the organization and its natural growth rate, modeled as a kind of interest
on unused manpower. The goal of attacks under this strategy is not primarily
to coerce the government into concessions, but to advertise the organization's
determination and capabilities to attract recruits and funds by attacks with a
high propaganda value.10 For instance, Wright (2006) notes that after the 2000
attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan
filled with new recruits, and contributors from the Gulf States arrived carry-
ing Samsonite suitcases filled with petrodollars. Further examples of terrorist
activities which are aimed at increasing the organization's manpower are the
Schleyer kidnapping by the RAF and the Landshut hijacking by the PFLP
(Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) in 1977 which were perpetrated
to free the first-generation RAF leadership from Stammheim prison.
Amongst the terrorist organizations which found themselves in competition
with other groups or had to grow from humble beginnings are the FLN (Front
de Libération Nationale) in Algeria, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and various
groups such as Hamas, Fatah, PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) and PFLP (Pop-
ular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) in Palestine.11 It can make sense
for the terrorist organization to lure governments into a false sense of security
to prevent a heavy crackdown in its early stages or to abstain from small at-
tacks with low propaganda value in order not to jeopardize a major attack that
is being planned. When observing a terrorist organization pursuing a growth
strategy, one would expect an increasing number of attacks with rising intensity
over time, as the terrorist group gathers more and more manpower which can in
turn be used for further attacks. As shown in Figure 1, this pattern exemplarily
becomes visible in the early activities of Hamas, a Palestinian terrorist group,
from 1989 until around 1994. For the years following 1994, a change in strategy
becomes visible as Hamas focused on fewer but more lethal attacks, which can
be seen as a shift towards more expensive, but also more cost-effective large
attacks as predicted by Feinstein and Kaplan (2010).12
10For a treatise on the interplay between terrorist attacks, propaganda and the media see
Rohner and Frey (2007).
11The FLN initially tried to unite the various anti-colonial groups in Algeria and focused
on fighting non-revolutionary elements in the population, and the Tamil Tigers faced a
plethora of similar Tamil groups during the 70's. Ideological and political divisions have led
to the creation of several competing Palestinian terrorist groups which vie for public support
and influence. See Hoffman and McCormick (2004), Bloom (2004) and Clauset et al. (2010).
12The effectiveness of Israeli counter-terrorism measures such as the West Bank barrier
during the Second Intifada becomes visible in the drastic reduction of casualties per attack
after 2002.
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Figure 1: Number and casualties of Hamas attacks between 1989 and 2008.
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (2011)
3 Model
Assume that the world is populated by two actors, a government and a terrorist
organization. These entities are only active in two periods. I first turn to the
characterization of the terrorist organization in the absence of an endogenous
government response. This basically constitutes a simplified version of the model
presented in Feinstein and Kaplan (2010). Feinstein and Kaplan additionally
include a choice of scale for terrorist attacks, but this element is not necessary
for the analysis of the signaling aspect of the game.13
3.1 Terrorist organization
The terrorist organization, by attacking the government and benefiting from a
positive propaganda effect, maximizes its manpower at the end of the second
13If terrorists choose both attack type (big/small, see Section 3.1) and scale (continuous
function), the government's counter-terrorism response will affect the optimal scale, too. The
optimization problem of the terrorists is thus not as straightforward as in the simplified case
presented in this paper, but the ordering of attacks with regard to initial manpower would
still be the same.
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period, given its available manpower M1 at the beginning of the first period.
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The focus on manpower is justified as it constitutes the main constraint on the
extent of terrorist activities (Feinstein and Kaplan, 2010).
Terrorists have two attack options: The first is an attack that requires little
planning and manpower effort Cs and yields low propaganda benefits s. It
is carried out at the end of the period in which its planning costs are paid.
This kind of attack is called small/type s. Given sufficient initial manpower,
terrorists are able to perpetrate one small attack in each period. Examples for
this kind of terrorist activity are the attacks by the Juba Sniper against targets
of opportunity (i.e. unaware US soldiers who happened to be at the wrong place
at the wrong time) and suicide bombings in public places as in Israel during the
Second Intifada.15 Hoffman and McCormick (2004) state that only a few days
to a few weeks are necessary to recruit, train and deploy a suicide bomber, with
very low planning effort and a material cost of around $US 150.
The second attack option, called big/type b, requires a high manpower and
planning effort Cb and generates a propaganda benefit of b, but also takes two
periods to prepare. This means that if the terrorist organization wants to initiate
this kind of attack, it can only do so and has to employ the manpower at the
beginning of the first period, while the actual attack will not take place until
the end of the second period. A prime example of this kind of terrorist attack
is 9/11 which took several years to prepare, involved dozens of operatives and
required flight lessons for the terrorist pilots. Manpower is completely used up
in an attack, e.g. because the involved operatives are killed or the planners and
perpetrators of an attack are subsequently discovered by anti-terror agencies.
In the first period, attacks go through unhindered, but in the second period
counter-terrorism efforts are in place which reduce the chance of successfully
perpetrating attacks.16 The success probability of an attack, given by θ, con-
stitutes a negative function of government counter-terrorism spending, but is
assumed to be exogenous in this section. θ will be discussed in detail in Section
14The increase in manpower after an attack does not have to come from its propaganda
value alone. There are numerous instances in which terrorist organizations attempted to free
imprisoned fellow terrorists through their attacks which is an even more direct way of raising
the available human resources than propaganda.
15The Juba Sniper was an individual or a group of individuals who ambushed US soldiers
in the Iraqi city of Baghdad with a single sniper gunshot, usually inflicting a casualty.
16Introducing exogenous counter-terrorism in the first period would just reduce the benefits
terrorists can reap in this period. Thus, the θ-parameter for the first period is omitted as it
does not add to the dynamics of the model. It is also possible to assume that the attack in
period 1 is directed against another country and thus inflicts no damage upon the government,
but is observed nevertheless and thus conveys information about the terrorist group size.
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3.2, and at this point it suffices to say that θ = 1 means that the government
does nothing at all to prevent terror attacks and that the success probability of
an attack is therefore 1. Similarly, θ = 0 implies that every attack attempt is
doomed to fail, i.e. the success probability is zero. In the case of a foiled attack
attempt, the manpower costs of initiating the attack are lost and no propaganda
benefit is generated.
Given sufficient manpower, a terrorist organization can plan both types of at-
tacks in the same period, i.e. it is possible to perpetrate a small attack in the first
period while also starting preparations for a big attack in period 2. At the same
time, terrorists can only plan one attack of each type in each period, so the set of
possible strategies is given by {no attacks, s1, s2, s1s2, b2, s1b2, s1s2b2, s2b2},
where the subscripts denote the period in which the attack takes place.
The expected value of the terrorists' utility function UT (similar to the ex-
pected amount of manpower at the end of period 2) is given by the expected
net benefit of attacks. This net benefit is an attack's propaganda value times
its success probability minus its manpower costs. At the same time, a terrorist
group is constrained by its available manpower in each period. Therefore, the
terrorist organization's expected utility function and its budget constraints look
as follows:
E(UT ) = (s− Cs)|s1 + (θs− Cs)|s2 + (θb− Cb)|b2
M1 ≥ (Cs)|s1 + (Cb)|b2
M2 = M1 + s|s1 − (Cs)|s1 − (Cb)|b2 ≥ (Cs)|s2 (1)
The subscripts |s1, |s2, |b2 indicate that the term only enters the budget con-
straint and utility function if an attack of type s, b is planned in period 1, 2.
In the first period the terrorist organization can only plan attacks if its initial
manpower endowment is sufficiently high to afford at least a small attack. In
the second period, terrorists reap the manpower benefit s if they perpetrated a
small attack in period 1 and can use this manpower and the manpower left over
from period 1 to plan another small attack. The initial manpower M1 is drawn
from a distribution µ with support [0,∞[ and cumulative distribution function
G.
To determine a terrorist organization's best course of action it will also be
assumed that the manpower gained through the propaganda value of an attack
is higher than the manpower cost of this attack. Furthermore, the cost-benefit
ratio of a big attack is sufficiently high in relation to that of a small attack so
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that given the choice, terrorists would rather perpetrate one big attack instead of
two small ones. This is another way of expressing the higher returns to scale of a
big attack which are assumed in Feinstein and Kaplan (2010). E.g., Al-Qaeda's
costs of perpetrating the 9/11 attacks are estimated to be between $US 400,000
and $US 500,000 (9/11 Commission Report, 2003), while the resulting direct
costs in capital and human losses alone supposedly lie between $US 20 and $US
60 billion (Schneider et al., 2010). Including further costs which are difficult to
measure such as distortions in consumption behaviour, additional unproductive
protection spending and expenditures for the War on Terror which, one could
argue, served partly as propaganda for terrorists, makes it clear that the 9/11
attacks had an unprecedented net benefit for the terrorists.17 The net benefit
of small attacks (which are also not infinitely often repeatable) can be assumed
to be much lower. Formally, these conditions can be expressed as
s > Cs, b > Cb, b− Cb > 2(s− Cs) (2)
Given this setup and an exogenous θ > Cs/s and M1, it is possible to de-
termine a terrorist organization's attack strategy.18 The strategy yielding the
highest benefit, i.e. the highest manpower at the end of period 2, is to plan
both small attacks and also the big attack. If resources are not sufficient for
this strategy, only planning the big attack is optimal. And if resources at the be-
ginning of period 1 do not allow the planning of a big attack, perpetrating small
attacks twice is optimal. Terrorist organizations can thus be classified according
to their initial size (see Table 1 in Appendix A): A large-type organization can
perpetrate all attacks, a medium-type one has sufficient manpower for a big
attack, a small-type organization can only afford to plan small attacks, and
none-type terrorists do not have the resources for any kind of attack.
3.2 Government
I will now characterize the government's utility function and optimization prob-
lem. In the world presented in this model the government faces a tradeoff
between investing an exogenously given budget B in an anti-terror technology
t which lowers the success probability θ of utility-reducing terrorist attacks and
17The direct costs of the London tube bombings in 2005, for instance, are assumed to be
less than ¿1 billion (GLA Economics, 2006).
18θ > Cs/s ensures that the expected benefit from a second period attack outweighs its
costs.
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investing in a consumption technology χ with input x from which it derives im-
mediate utility. It is not necessary to be more specific about the exact nature of
the anti-terror technology. For the purpose of this paper, protecting vulnerable
sites works in the same way as infiltrating terrorist networks and uncovering ter-
rorist plots.19 The nature of the consumption technology can also be left fairly
general. One could think of non-security related government spending or even
of security-related pork-barrel spending that does not enhance protection from
terrorist attacks. Coats et al. (2006), for instance, find that funds from the 2004
US Homeland Security grant were allocated to states on a vote-per-capita base
rather than in proportion to a state's population, leading to an over-protection
of small states with a low terrorism risk.
The utility of the government depends only on the second period. It is
assumed that in the first period, the government is simply surprised by the
emergence of a terrorist organization or has fixed policies in place which cannot
be altered before the second period. In the second period, the government
bases its spending decisions on full knowledge about all parameters and the
distribution of M1. I.e., it knows the damage incurred from each attack type
and probability of a particular terrorist organization to emerge, but not which
type is really active at the beginning of period 2 and which attacks are being
planned. It seems reasonable to assume that governments can infer a somewhat
precise distribution and potential damage assessment of the current terrorist
threat through intelligence gathering activities, informers and other sources.20
The government derives utility from consumption and disutility from the
damage inflicted by terrorist attacks which is equal to the propaganda benefit
for the terrorists.21 The expected value of its utility function UG and its budget
constraint thus take the form
E(UG) = χ(x)− θ(t)× ((αsmall + αlarge)s+ (αmedium + αlarge)b+ αnone(0))
B = x+ t (3)
αsmall gives the probability (derived from the distribution of the initial man-
19An extensive literature exists on the choice of counter-terrorism strategy and the allocation
of security spending. See, for instance, Powell (2007), Golany et al. (2009), Arce and Sandler
(2005) and Enders and Sandler (1993).
20For instance, two months before the 9/11 attacks the CIA reported strong evidence of an
imminent Al-Qaeda attack. The US government chose not to act on this information, however
(Washington Post, 2006, October 1).
21Making the government's damage and the terrorists' benefit from an attack asymmetric
would simply require the introduction of a scaling parameter.
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power µ and the manpower necessary to initiate an attack) that a small terrorist
organization is present in the world and will launch a small attack. Similarly,
αmedium, αlarge and αnone denote the probabilities that a terrorist organization
of this type is present and will strike in period 2 according to its optimal strat-
egy (see Table 1). The alphas have to add up to one. The characteristics of χ
and θ are as follows:
χ(0) = 0, χ′(0) =∞, χ′ > 0, χ′′ < 0 (4)
θ(0) = 1, θ(∞) > 0, θ′(0) = −∞, θ′ < 0, θ′′ > 0 (5)
These conditions ensure that the success probability of an attack is greater than
0 and equal or smaller than 1 and that it is impossible to have full protection
against terrorism. Furthermore, the government will always expend its budget
on both technologies. The α-probabilities are constructed as follows:
αnone = G(Cs), αsmall = G(Cb)−G(Cs)
αmedium = G(Cb + Cs)−G(Cb), αlarge = 1−G(Cb + Cs) (6)
See Figure 2 for a graphical representation.
By differentiating (3) with respect to x and t, setting these derivatives equal
and utilizing the conditions in (4) and (5) the optimal choices of t and x are
implicitly given by
∂χ
∂x
= −∂θ
∂t
((αsmall + αlarge)s+ (αmedium + αlarge)b+ αnone(0)) (7)
From (7), it is obvious that an increase in the damage from attacks and a
decrease in the probability that a terror organization of type none is present
will increase the benefit from spending the budget on t. The α-probabilities are
also linked to the costs of terror attacks (see Figure 2). As these costs decrease,
the probability of the emergence of a more powerful terror organization rises,
and thus a higher t-spending becomes optimal.
4 Terrorist attacks and government responses
Having described the autonomous decisions of the terrorist organization and the
government I will now turn to the interaction between the two actors. Here, as
11
Figure 2: α given M1.
commonly assumed in game theoretic models of terrorist-government interac-
tions, terrorists are fully informed about the government's preferences and can
thus perfectly anticipate the government's reaction to their actions (c.f. La-
pan and Sandler (1993), Overgaard (1994)). The information structure is thus
asymmetric, with the government having an informational disadvantage as it
does not know which terrorist group size is drawn from the distribution µ.
It will be necessary to determine the government's reaction in two possible
cases: First, if a small attack takes place in the first period, and second, if no
small attack is launched in the first period. The government will be aware that
terrorist organizations might try to hide their true strength and terrorists will
no longer take θ as exogenous. This implies that terrorists in period 1 might
want to avoid provoking a severe government response which hampers attacks
in period 2 and therefore abstain from attacking in period 1. I call this pattern
of behaviour in which a terror organization wants to appear smaller than it is
mimicking.
To restrict the number of possible scenarios assume that θ(B)×s−Cs > 0, so
a small attack in period 2 would still be beneficial for the terrorist organization
even if the government were to spend its entire budget on counter-terrorism
12
measures.22 For example, the number of possible targets within a country could
be so large that it is not possible to protect all of them sufficiently with a given
counter-terrorism budget. This assumption rules out cases in which terrorists
abstain from attacking in the second period as the success probability of attacks
is too low to justify the planning costs. Under this assumption, the game is
solvable by backwards induction. The terrorists' attack decision in the second
period which is contingent on the government's counter-terrorism expenditure
and the terrorists' first period choice of attacks forms the third stage of the
game. The second stage consists of the government's counter-terrorism spending
decision which is driven by the terrorist behaviour observed in period 1. Finally,
in the first stage it is determined whether the terrorists opt for a small first
period and a big second period attack or not. The decision stages and timing
of events are given in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Decision stages and timing of events.
22This implies that a large attack is also beneficial as its benefit-cost ratio is higher.
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4.1 Boundedly rational government
In this subsection, the government no longer bases its budget allocation deci-
sion on µ, s and b alone, but also on the terrorists' behaviour it observes in
period 1. This allows the government to rule out the existence of particular
organization types and thus optimize its spending on t by reducing uncertainty.
It does not yet, however, take into account the strategic aspect of its decision,
i.e. that terrorist behaviour in the first period also depends on the expected
counter-terrorism efforts. The model with this kind of bounded rationality is
more straightforward and will thus be presented first, but qualitatively the same
results are achieved with a fully strategic government as shown in the next sub-
section.
First, consider the case that the government is hit by a small attack in period
1. The government correctly deduces that neither a terrorist organization of
type none nor of type medium can be present as a none type cannot afford to
start an attack at all, and a medium type saves its manpower for a big attack
in period 2.23 The government thus forms posterior beliefs β about the odds of
facing a small or large terror organization and has an expected utility function
of the following form:
E(UG) = χ(x)− θ(t)× ((βsmall + βlarge)s+ βlargeb) (8)
The β-terms are constructed by utilizing Bayes' theorem. In this setup, this
amounts to scaling up the prior probability of the emergence of a particular
terrorist organization with the remaining probability mass after subtracting the
probabilities of terrorist types which cannot be present:
βlarge =
αlarge
αlarge + αsmall
23The case in which a medium sized group acts like a small sized one will not be considered
here. If the counter-terrorism response in period 2 is sufficiently stiff, a medium sized group
may find it beneficial to perpetrate two small attacks (one of them unopposed) instead of
one big attack. However, this change of strategy cannot be properly described as mimicking
because the second period attack can then only be of the small type. The medium terrorist
organization not only appears to be a small one in the first period, it also behaves like one in
the second period. Also, for a portrayal of the interaction between terrorists and government
it is sufficient to show the mimicking behaviour of one type of terrorists and the subsequent
government response. To formally rule out the case in which a medium sized group changes
its strategy to two small attacks, it would be sufficient to assume that 2(s−Cs) < θ(B)b−Cb.
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βsmall =
αsmall
αlarge + αsmall
(9)
After having determined the government's belief if an attack takes place in
the first period, assume now the opposite case in which the government is not
attacked in period 1. The government infers that no small terror organization
can be active because terrorists of the small type cannot gain anything from
abstaining from a first period attack; the benefits from an unopposed small
attack in period 1 and a subsequent risky attack in period 2 are always greater
than the benefit from initiating just a risky small attack in period 2. Terrorist
types none and medium are following their optimal and possible strategies if
they do not attack in period 1, but large terror organizations could mimic a
medium one to keep the government's response in period 2 at a lower level. The
government therefore updates its prior beliefs α to the new probabilities γ in
the same way as described above and arrives at an expected utility function of
the form
E(UG) = χ(x)− θ(t)× (γlarges+ (γlarge + γmedium)b+ γnone(0)) (10)
The γ-terms are derived in the same way as the β-terms in (9):
γlarge =
αlarge
αlarge + αmedium + αnone
γmedium =
αmedium
αlarge + αmedium + αnone
γnone =
αnone
αlarge + αmedium + αnone
(11)
It is now possible to predict in which case (small attack/no attack in period 1)
the counter-terrorism reaction of the government will be stronger. This is done
by calculating the optimal responses for (8) and (10) as in (7) and comparing
the terms attached to ∂θ/∂t. If the expected damage in period 2, calculated
from the updated beliefs about the terrorist group size, is higher if no attack
is observed in period 1 than if a small attack takes place, the government will
react more strongly in the absence of an attack. Thus, t will be higher when no
first period attack takes place if
γlarges+ (γlarge + γmedium)b > (βsmall + βlarge)s+ βlargeb (12)
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Figure 4: Optimal government response t for varying s.
On the left hand side is the damage from a particular attack times the proba-
bility of this attack taking place for the no attack case, and on the right hand
side the equivalent expression for the attack case. This can be rewritten as
(βsmall + βlarge − γlarge)s+ (βlarge − γlarge − γmedium)b < 0 (13)
For a non-degenerate µ (that is, a distribution that does not attach probability 1
to a single type), the first term in brackets is always positive. Thus, a necessary
but not sufficient condition for (13) to hold is that γlarge + γmedium > βlarge,
i.e. that the probability of either a large or medium terrorist organization being
present in the no attack case has to be higher than the probability of a large ter-
rorist organization being present in the attack case. Furthermore, the damage
the government suffers from a big attack has to be large relative to the damage
from a small attack for (13) to hold. A higher s will decrease the likelihood
that the counter-terrorism reaction in the case of no attack in period 1 is larger.
This probability is also decreasing in βlarge and increasing in γlarge. This can
be summarized in:
Proposition 1: A boundedly rational government will engage in higher counter-
terrorism spending if no first period attack takes place, if the expected second
period damage given the updated government beliefs is higher in the no attack
16
case.
Figure 4 gives a graphical example for Proposition 1. Intuitively, the government
might reason that the terrorist organization does not have sufficient resources to
mount a larger attack in the next period if it observes a small attack in period
1. This is particularly the case when the government draws the conclusion from
the assumed distribution of terrorist organization sizes that the existence of a
large organization is very unlikely. An observed attack will thus strengthen the
belief that a small terrorist organization is active which will only perpetrate a
small attack in the next period. Similarly, the absence of an attack may lead the
government to believe that a medium terrorist organization or a large terrorist
organization mimicking a medium one is plotting against it. It will therefore
employ heavier security measures than if an attack in the first period were to
take place.
The terrorists will take the aforementioned government decision into account
when deciding on their optimal strategy at the onset of period 1, as it is as-
sumed that they can perfectly anticipate the counter-terrorism response. The
mimicking strategy I will focus on here is when a large terrorist organization
mimics a medium one by not attacking in period 1. The case in which a medium
terrorist organization acts like a small one will not be considered. A large ter-
rorist organization will find it optimal to abstain from launching a small attack
in period 1 if the benefit from a lower counter-terrorism response in period 2
outweighs the loss from foregoing the small attack in period one. Denote by
t|γ (t|β) the t resulting from the government's belief set γ (β). Then, suppress-
ing variables which appear in the same form on both sides, large terrorists will
display mimicking behaviour if
θ(t|γ)(b+ s) ≥ θ(t|β)(b+ s) + (s− Cs) (14)
While possibly lowering the government's vigilance in period 2, foregoing a
small attack in period 1 means giving up the benefit (s − Cs). From (13), s
lowers θ(t|β) relative to θ(t|γ) and thus it is indeterminate whether mimicking
behaviour becomes less or more attractive in s as s enters the right-hand side
of (14) both positively and negatively. From (14), it is obvious that a large
terror organization will never mimic a medium one if (13) holds, that is, if the
government's reaction in the absence of an attack is stronger than to an attack.
Also, from (13), the more probability the government attaches to βlarge and the
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less to γlarge, the higher is the incentive for a large terrorist group to mimic a
medium sized one. I.e., the more the government expects a large group to be
present in the case of a first period attack and the less in the absence of an
attack, the more large groups benefit from hiding their true strength.
Figure 5: Extensive-form game for a boundedly rational government.
The extensive-form game of the government-terrorist interaction is shown in
Figure 5. The mimicking behaviour of large terrorist organizations is summa-
rized in:
Proposition 2: Large terrorist organizations facing a boundedly rational gov-
ernment will mimic medium ones and abstain from launching a small attack
in period 1 if the additional expected damage from an increased attack success
probability in period 2 is larger than the foregone benefit from a small first period
attack.
See Figure 6 for an illustration of Proposition 2. As pointed out in the in-
troduction, terrorists with the goal of exacting concessions from a government,
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Figure 6: Expected manpower for a large terrorist organization for varying s.
such as the ones in the models by Overgaard (1994) and Lapan and Sandler
(1993) will want to appear as serious a threat as possible. But this no longer
holds if terrorists pursue a growth strategy as in this paper. More generally, if
terrorist attacks generate a benefit for the perpetrator apart from the possibility
of government concessions, terrorists may want to lure governments into a false
sense of security to strike unopposed on a greater scale.
4.2 Fully rational government
In the previous section, the government considered that large terrorist groups
can mimic medium-sized ones, and can thus be present regardless of whether an
attack is observed in the first period or not. However, the government did not
take into account that its counter-terrorism spending may not be optimal in the
sense that large terrorist groups may have an incentive to always or never mimic,
if the government reacts to events in the first period according to the β and γ
probabilities. The updating of the government's beliefs is therefore only bound-
edly rational in the previous section, as it ignores the strategic implications of
the government's actions for the terrorists.
For example, a boundedly rational government does not rule out the possi-
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bility of a large terrorist group being present when it observes no attack in the
first period, and chooses t according to the γ probabilities. It could now be the
case that, given this t which is anticipated by the terrorists, a large terrorist
group would have no incentive to mimic as (14) does not hold. The government's
counter-terrorism spending level, which is based on updated beliefs erroneously
factoring in the possible presence of a large terrorist group, would thus be too
high.
This section examines the case in which the government acts fully rational,
so it takes into account that the mimicking decision of a large terrorist organi-
zation in period 1 depends on the expected reaction of the government in period
2: terrorists anticipate the government's reaction to their first period actions
and choose their strategy accordingly. The incidents in the first period are still
exogenous for the government as it has no possibility to credibly commit to a
counter-terrorism strategy before the terrorists choose their actions. This means
that the government's counter-terrorism spending decision does not have to con-
sider the damage that could be averted if the government's strategy encourages
large terrorist organizations to abstain from attacking in the first period.
Any strategy a fully rational goverment would choose has to be consistent
with its beliefs about the behaviour of the terrorist organizations. Equilibrium
strategies of the government and the terrorists therefore have to constitute a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in which the terrorists' and government's
beliefs about each other's strategy are consistent with their own strategies and
vice versa.24
A large terrorist organization is indifferent between mimicking and not mim-
icking a medium-sized one if the gain in expected utility from a lower level of
counter-terrorism in the second period is equal to the loss in utility from fore-
going a small attack in the first period. This is the case if (14) holds with
equality.
Let tA (tNA) be the counter-terrorism spending level the government chooses
if an attack (no attack) takes place in period 1. Furthermore, denote by t|γ¯ the
counter-terrorism spending if no first period attack takes place that, given t|β ,
would make (14) an equality. Similarly, denote by t|β¯ the value of t|β that, given
t|γ , would make (14) an equality if an attack takes place. Thus, by rearranging
24I also require that beliefs are structurally consistent (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, section
9C). I.e., if the government knows that terrorists are indifferent between two options, it cannot
possibly assume that one option is chosen with a higher probability than the other.
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(14),
t|γ¯ = θ−1(θ(t|β) +
(s− Cs)
(b+ s)
) (15)
t|β¯ = θ
−1(θ(t|γ)− (s− Cs)
(b+ s)
) (16)
First, I examine the case t|γ¯ < t|γ , so (14) does not hold. If a first period
attack takes place, choosing tA = t|β is optimal for the government as it correctly
anticipates the presence of either a small or large terrorist group. But the
government knows that if t|γ¯ < t|γ , a large terrorist organization will never
mimic a medium one if it sets tNA = t|γ as by doing so it loses the benefits from
the first period attack and is not sufficiently compensated by a reduction in
counter-terrorism measures. Thus, t|γ is an higher-than-optimal level of counter-
terrorism as it incorrectly assumes the presence of a large terrorist organization
and thus too severe a threat.
Ruling out tNA = t|γ as optimal response leads to two further cases: If
the probability of the presence of a medium-sized group is sufficiently high, the
government will still engage in higher counter-terrorism spending than t|γ¯ as
it faces a high risk of a big attack by a group of type medium. Denote the
optimal level of counter-terrorism spending if the government expects a none-
or medium-type terrorist organization to be present by t|m, and assume that
t|γ¯ < t|m.25 The government's strategy tA = t|β , tNA = t|m then constitutes
a PBE: If no attack takes place in the first period and the government chooses
tNA = t|m, large terrorist groups will never opt for a mimicking strategy and
tNA = t|m is optimal for the expected presence of either a terrorist organization
of medium or none type. Similarly, if an attack takes place, tA = t|β is optimal
given the possibility that either a small or large group is active, and large groups
always perpetrate a small attack in the first period.
In the aforementioned equilibrium, the government chooses a higher level of
counter-terrorism spending if it is not attacked in the first period if t|β < t|m.
From the construction of t|β and t|m this condition is given as
αlarge
αlarge + αsmall
+
s
b
<
αmedium
αmedium + αnone
(17)
(17) holds if the ratio sb is small and if the probability of the emergence of a
small or medium group is high in comparison to the emergence of a group of type
25t|m is implicitly given by
∂χ
∂x
= − ∂θ
∂t
(
(
αmedium
αmedium+αnone
)b
)
.
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none or large. The behaviour of the government can therefore be summarized in:
Proposition 3: If t|γ¯ < t|m < t|γ , a fully rational government will engage in
higher counter-terrorism spending if no first period attack takes place
• if the damage from a big attack is large in comparison to the damage from
a small attack and
• if the probability of either a small or medium group being active is large
in comparison to the probability of the emergence of a group of type none
or large.
However, if the probability of the emergence of a medium-sized group is low,
t|m < t|γ¯ and t|m cannot be the optimal level of counter-terrorism spending
as at this spending level, mimicking again becomes the strategy of choice for
large terrorist organizations. tNA = t|m would therefore be lower than optimal
as it omits the possible presence of a large terrorist group. It turns out that
a pure strategy PBE generally does not exist if t|m < t|γ¯ < t|γ . The best the
government can do if it does not have a belief-consistent optimal strategy that
induces large groups to always or never mimic is to make large groups indifferent.
However, a strategy that makes large groups indifferent is belief-consistent only
in special cases. The reasoning for these two results is presented in Appendix
B.
Now assume that t|γ¯ > t|γ , so (14) holds. If no attack is observed the
government sets tNA = t|γ as it correctly expects the presence of either a none-,
medium- or large-type terrorist-organization. But if an attack occurs in the
first period, tA = t|β is no longer optimal as the government knows that at this
counter-terrorism spending level large terrorist groups will pursue a mimicking
strategy. So only a small terrorist group can be the perpetrator. Denote by
t|s the optimal counter-terrorism spending if the government expects a small
terrorist group to be active.26 If t|s > t|β¯ , the government will set tA = t|s
as the possible existence of a small terrorist group warrants higher spending
than t|β¯ . The government's belief that large terrorist organizations will never
attack in the first period, in combination with the strategy tA = t|s, tNA = t|γ ,
therefore constitutes a PBE as large terrorist groups will indeed never choose
to initiate a first period attack given these tA and tNA.
26t|s is implicitly given by
∂χ
∂x
= − ∂θ
∂t
((αsmall)s).
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If t|s < t|β¯ , tA = t|s cannot be optimal as at this counter-terrorism level large
terrorist groups would abandon the mimicking strategy and always attack in the
first period. So tA < t|β¯ would be too low, and the government would want to
increase its spending. Again, as in the case of t|m < t|γ¯ < t|γ , if t|γ¯ > t|γ and
t|s < t|β¯ a pure strategy PBE generally will not exist (see Appendix B). The
mimicking behaviour of large terrorist organizations if they face a fully rational
government is summarized in:
Proposition 4: If t|γ < t|γ¯ and tβ¯ < t|s, large terrorist organizations facing
a fully rational government will mimic medium ones and abstain from launch-
ing a small attack in period 1.
The assumption of a fully rational government thus changes the results of
the model in the following ways: There are three mutually exclusive PBE for
an appropriate choice of parameter values. In two of these the government will
be able to tell which strategy a large terrorist organization will pursue as its
choice of counter-terrorism spending uniquely determines the terrorists' optimal
strategy. In the third, the government chooses its reaction so as to make large
terrorist groups indifferent with regard to attacking or not in the first period.
There also exists a range of parameter values for which the model has no pure
strategy PBE.
It is still possible that in the absence of an attack counter-terrorism efforts
will be higher than if an attack took place. If t|γ¯ < t|m < t|γ and t|β < t|m a
fully rational government will react stronger if no first period attack takes place.
In contrast, a boundedly rational government as shown in section 4.1 requires
that t|β < t|γ to have higher counter-terrorism spending in the absence of an
attack.
A mimicking strategy is still viable for terrorists given appropriate parame-
ter values, but it occurs under different conditions than in section 4.1 where (14)
was required to hold. A large terrorist organization will now pursue a mimicking
strategy if t|γ < t|γ¯ and tβ¯ < t|s.
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Figure 7: (Attempted) terror attacks in Europe, changes of budgets in % rela-
tive to the previous year for the Federal Criminal Agency (BKA), the German
Federal Police (Bundespolizei), the Federal Office for the Protection of the Con-
stitution (Verfassungsschutz) and changes in total spending on these agencies
and total government spending without investments and debt service. Source:
Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2004-2012)
5 Discussion
The previous section has developed a framework to analyze the attack decisions
of terrorists and the subsequent counter-terrorism expenditures of governments.
This section will discuss the results with attention to real-world observations.
Propositions 1 and 3 state that a terrorist organization's choice to attack does
not necessarily evoke a heavier government counter-terrorism response than the
choice not to attack. Evidence from Germany shows no clear connection between
(attempted) terrorist attacks and expenditures on counter-terrorism measures,
i.e. the commonly assumed positive response of counter-terrorism efforts to re-
cent attacks is hard to discern in reality. Figure 7 illustrates that attempted and
successful terror attacks (description in Table 2 in Appendix A) in Europe and
Germany did not systematically drive up German counter-terrorism spending.
Total government expenditures increased faster than security-related spending
from 2005 to 2007 regardless of several attacks. In 2008 and 2009, the opposite
was the case during a lull of terrorist activity, although one could argue that
24
the 2007 attacks triggered the security spending increases. The Verfassungss-
chutz, however, one of the main German agencies to combat terrorism, slightly
reduced its budget in 2009 and increased it again in 2010 by 20%. From 2010
to 2012, three attacks took place and counter-terrorism spending was fairly sta-
ble while total government spending varied wildly due to the financial crisis.27
The absence of a discernible positive relationship between terrorist attacks and
counter-terrorism budgets is supportive of the notion laid down in Propositions
1 and 3; governments may take an attack as an indicator that a terrorist orga-
nization has very limited resources or is not of a particularly dangerous size.
Propositions 2 and 4 claim that terrorist organizations may want to appear
weaker than they are to avoid a strong government counter-terrorism response
which could endanger future operations. While non-growth oriented terrorists
are known to threaten attacks if countries do or do not take a particular course
of action (e.g., Al-Qaeda threatened to attack Germany if chancellor Merkel
were to be reelected in 2009), terrorists with a focus on manpower building
should keep quiet so as not to alert the authorities. For instance, the NSU
(Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund), a German neo-nazi terror group, did not
publicly claim responsibility for its attacks, but circulated propaganda videos
of their deeds within the neo-nazi milieu. German authorities did not even
attribute most of the attacks to a terrorist organization, but considered them
to be part of a turf war between non-native criminals. As current investigations
begin to uncover, the three active members of the NSU were supported by a
considerable network of sympathizers they had built over a decade.
Assessing the real strength of terrorist organizations is a particularly diffi-
cult undertaking due to their clandestine nature, loosely affiliated groups and
global networks. While terror organizations often boast about their capabilities,
communiques in which they claim to be on the wane and weak are rare. But
terrorism has been found to follow a cyclical pattern which is indicative of strate-
gic behaviour, i.e. terrorists who engage in inter-temporal substitution to catch
governments unprepared (Enders and Sandler, 2002). The intelligence-based
updating of beliefs about the magnitude of the terrorist threat in the absence
of specific attack announcements shows that some terrorists attempt to appear
weak or non-existent prior to attacking. E.g., in late 2010 the German Ministry
27German counter-terrorism efforts are divided between the BKA, the Bundespolizei and the
Verfassungsschutz. Further involved agencies are the federal secret service (Bundesnachricht-
endienst) and the military intelligence service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst). It is difficult to
determine the funds which are specifically used to combat terrorism within these organizations.
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of the Interior announced an increased threat level based on new intelligence
and the discovery of several parcel bombs. The terror organizations responsible
for this increased threat obviously did not announce their demands or attack
plans in advance. Without any attacks taking place, the level of alertness was
lowered again in early 2011 (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2011).
6 Conclusion
This paper has integrated the signaling game structure of terrorist attacks as in
Lapan and Sandler (1993) into a framework of organizational growth of terrorist
groups as in Feinstein and Kaplan (2010). The main findings are that terrorists
act rational if they try to hide their true strength and appear weaker than
they are, and that governments do not necessarily increase counter-terrorism
measures more strongly if they observe a terrorist attack than if no attack takes
place. In contrast to the Arce and Sandler (2007) model in which a mechanical
government response to a spectacular attack can encourage the inter-temporal
substitution of attacks by carrying forward resources between periods, this paper
shows that first period restraint on part of the terrorists can be aimed at raising
the level of uncertainty the government faces.
The driving factor behind these results is that terrorists are interested in
organizational growth, not in concessions from the government. Furthermore,
their attacks are assumed to have a propaganda value which attracts new re-
cruits. Governments therefore need to be aware that it not only matters whether
their terrorist opponents are political or military, but also whether they are
currently pursuing a growth strategy. For the prediction and interpretation of
terrorist behaviour the differing motivations play an important role, which, as in
Arce and Sandler (2007), emphasizes the role of intelligence in the fight against
terrorism.
The model could be expanded to include a commitment device such as long-
term counter-terrorism investments on the part of the government. This would
allow to examine costs and benefits of commitment to a particular counter-
terrorism strategy, and shed light on the value of real-world policies which create
long-term commitments for governments in the struggle against terrorism.
As this paper, in contrast to the discussed literature, argues that terrorists
may have an incentive to appear weaker than they are, a further fruitful avenue
of research lies in developing a model in which terrorists can signal both weak-
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ness and strength. This would allow to examine the interaction of governments
and terrorists if the world is populated by small terrorist groups who may want
to appear stronger than they are, and large groups who prefer to appear weak.
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Appendix A: Tables
Type of
terror orga-
nization
Initial size Optimal
strategy
Example
None M1 < Cs No attacks -
Small Cs ≤M1 <
Cb
s1, s2 NSU (Germany), nine
assassinations of foreign
businessmen between 2000 and
2006 and two bomb attacks
Medium Cb ≤M1 <
Cs + Cb
b2 Al-Qaeda, simultaneous
bombings of the American
embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998
Large Cb + Cs ≤
M1
s1, s2, b2 RAF (Germany), bank
robberies,
assassinations/kidnappings of
prominent Germans,
Stockholm embassy attack in
the '70s
Table 1: Optimal terrorist organization strategies based on M1 with exogenous
government response and corresponding stylized examples.
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Name Date Description Outcome Casualties
London attack July
2005
Suicide attacks on
London's public
transport system.
4 suicide terrorists
successfully
detonated their
bombs during the
morning
rush-hour.
52 dead, over
700 injured
Kofferbomber July
2006
Attempt to blow
up two German
suburban trains.
Bombs did not
explode and were
discovered, 2
terrorists arrested.
-
Heathrow plot August
2006
Attempt to
detonate bombs
on at least 10
transatlantic
flights.
Plot discovered
before the attack
could be carried
out, several
terrorists arrested.
-
Sauerlandgruppe September
2007
Preparations for
assassinations and
bomb attacks.
No attacks
perpetrated, 4
alleged terrorists
arrested.
-
Glasgow attack June
2007
Car loaded with
propane gas
canisters driven
into Glasgow
International
Airport.
No serious fire
ensued, both
terrorists were
apprehended.
5 injured
Stockholm attack December
2010
Car bomb and a
backpack with
pipe bombs
detonated in
Stockholm.
Car bomb went
off, terrorist killed
by his own pipe
bomb.
2 injured
Frankfurt attack March
2011
Islamist gunman
attacking a USAF
bus at Frankfurt
airport.
Gunman shot
several soldiers
and was then
apprehended by
the police.
2 dead, 2
injured
Oslo attack July
2011
Car bomb
detonated in Oslo,
gunman attacks
youth summer
camp.
Car bomb went
off, gunman was
apprehended after
a shooting spree.
77 dead, 151
injured
Table 2: Description of terror attacks plotted in Figure 7.
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Appendix B: Absence of PBE if t|m < t|γ¯ < t|γ or
t|γ < t|γ¯, t|s < t|β¯
With a non-indifferent large terrorist group
There are two belief-consistent strategies for the government with non-indifferent
large terrorist groups: One in which the government chooses its spending so as to
make large terrorist groups always attack in the first period, and one in which
the counter-terrorist spending makes a large terrorist group always mimic a
medium one. However, neither of these strategies is optimal if the chance of the
appearance of a medium-sized terrorist group is low (t|m < t|γ¯ < t|γ) or if it is
unlikely that a small group is active (t|γ < t|γ¯ , t|s < t|β¯). The government is
either over- or underspending and always wants to readjust its counter-terrorism
efforts to the point where the strategies are no longer belief-consistent.
Assume first that t|m < t|γ¯ < t|γ . If the government sets t|m < t|γ¯ < tNA,
tA = t|β and expects large groups to always attack, large terrorists groups
indeed always attack in the first period, but the government is overspending if
no first period attack occurs. It thus wants to reduce tNA to t|m. But once
the spending (if no attack occurs) makes large terrorist groups indifferent with
regard to mimicking (at tNA = t|γ¯) , the government's belief that large terrorist
groups always attack is no longer correct.
Alternatively, the government expects large groups to always mimic and sets
tA = t|s and tNA so low that large groups prefer not to attack, the strategy is
belief-consistent, but the government is underspending if no first period attack
occurs. It therefore wants to increase tNA to t|γ , but once the spending (if no
attack occurs) makes large terrorist groups indifferent with regard to mimicking,
the government's belief that large terrorist groups never attack is no longer
correct.
Now assume that t|γ < t|γ¯ , t|s < t|β¯ . If the government sets tNA = t|m and
tA so low that large groups always want to attack, the government's beliefs are
consistent with the terrorist group's behaviour, but it is underspending if a first
period attack occurs. Therefore, the government wants to increase tA to t|β ,
but once the spending if an attack occurs becomes high enough to make large
terrorist groups indifferent with regard to mimicking, the government's belief
that large terrorist groups always attack is no longer correct.
If the government sets tNA = t|γ , t|s < t|β¯ < tA and expects large groups
to mimic medium ones, large terrorist groups indeed never attack in the first
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period, but the government is overspending if a first period attack occurs. It
thus wants to reduce tA to t|s, but once the spending if no attack occurs makes
large terrorist groups indifferent with regard to mimicking (at tA = t|β¯) , the
government's belief that large terrorist groups never attack is no longer correct.
It follows from this discussion that the only belief-consistent and optimal
strategy the government can pick in all cases is to choose tA and tNA so as
to make large groups indifferent with regard to mimicking, while taking into
account that tA and tNA have to maximize its utility under the belief that
large groups choose to attack half of the time. But, as shown below, such a
combination of tA and tNA does generally not exist.
With an indifferent large terrorist group
Assume that t|m < t|γ¯ and t|s < t|β¯ . The government wants to optimize its
counter-terrorism spending when large terrorist groups are indifferent between
attacking and not attacking in the first period, and thus choose each strategy
with the same probability.
The government knows that the chance of a large group being active in both
the attack and no attack case is half the conditional probability of a large group
being active. If it is attacked in the first period the government hence forms the
following belief set, denoted by δ:
δlarge =
0.5× αlarge
0.5× αlarge + αsmall
δsmall =
αsmall
0.5× αlarge + αsmall (18)
If the government is not attacked it forms the belief set ϕ:
ϕlarge =
0.5× αlarge
0.5× αlarge + αmedium + αnone
ϕmedium =
αmedium
0.5× αlarge + αmedium + αnone
ϕnone =
αnone
0.5× αlarge + αmedium + αnone (19)
From these probabilities, the counter-terrorism levels tA = t|δ and tNA = t|ϕ
are constructed according to (7). These spending levels are only optimal and
consistent with the government's belief that large terrorist groups are indifferent
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if large groups obtain the same utility regardless of whether they attack or not.
This, from (14), is the case if
θ(t|ϕ)(b+ s) = θ(t|δ)(b+ s) + (s− Cs) (20)
or, equivalently,
θ(t|ϕ) = θ(t|δ) +
s− Cs
b+ s
(21)
Here, it becomes visible that (21) only holds for particular value combinations
of α, s, b and Cs. It is therefore only in special cases that the government's
strategy to set tA = t|δ, tNA = t|ϕ under the belief that large terrorist groups
are indifferent constitutes a PBE.
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